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THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY: AL'S IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
By Michael Asimow l
While I was doing research in administrative law in the UK, I
made an interesting discovery. Nobody had ever heard of ALJs. The
same was true in South Africa and Australia. These countries have
plenty of administrative law and engage in a large volume of
administrative adjudication, but they have nothing that corresponds to
ALJs2--lawyers who serve as professionalized, full-time administrative
trial judges. That seemed curious to me and made me wonder how the
institution of the ALJ evolved in the United States.
Ann Young recently remarked in an article that the ambivalent
status of ALJs vis a vis agency heads is no accident--it was planned that
way. I Certainly, the status of ALJs is peculiar: they are employed by
the agencies for which they decide cases (unless they are members of
a central panel), yet they have a large amount of de jure and de facto
independence. They are relatively well paid and highly respected; they
regard themselves as true judges and militantly protect their
independent status. ALJs hear cases, find the facts, and apply the law-but their opinions are only proposed.4 Agency heads are free to
substitute their judgment for that of the ALJ on questions of fact, law
and discretion. Courts review the decisions of agency heads, not those
of the ALJ. ALJs generally act like true judges; their only job is to
hear cases and they usually receive no ex parte staff assistance. Yet the
agency heads who have the final call at the agency level typically
receive large doses of ex parte staff assistance. Those agency heads
'Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. Responses to this article are welcome. My
email address
is asimow@law.ucla.edu.
2

In this article, unless otherwise stated, the term "ALl"covers all administrative
trial judges, whether called ALJs, administrative judges, hearing officers, referees, or other
titles.
3
Judicial Independence in AdministrativeAdjudication: Past, Present andFuture,
38 Judges' J. #3, p. 16 (Summer 1999), Young, JudicialIndependence in Administrative
Adjudication: Past, Present,and Future, XIX J.NAALJ 117.
' In an increasing number of cases, especially in the states, ALJs now make the final
decision at the agency level. Agency heads are out of the loop. See Rossi, ALl FinalOrders
on Appeal: BalancingIndependence With Accountability, XIX J.NAALJ 1.
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often exercise the combined functions of rulemaking, investigation,
prosecution, and adjudication.5 Again, I wondered how such a peculiar
relationship evolved. This article is intended to give a bird's eye view
of the historic development of the institution of the ALJ and the
relationship between ALJs and agency heads. 6
It all started with the railroads. After the Civil War, as the
nation industrialized, the political and economic power of the railroads
posed immense problems. Powerful shippers were able to negotiate
favorable deals with the railroads; small farmers and less favored
business interests were drastically overcharged. While there was, in
theory, a judicial remedy for unfair rates, courts were unequal to the
task. In other countries, railroads were nationalized, but that was never
politically feasible in the U.S. A number of states responded to
political pressure from disgruntled shippers by creating state agencies
empowered to regulate the railroads. However, these state agencies
failed miserably. The railroads resisted them tenaciously; court
decisions accorded no finality to administrative rate decisions and
prevented state commissions from regulating interstate rates.
Nevertheless, the model of the combined-function regulatory
agency was at hand when Congress finally responded to political
pressures by creating the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887.
Like the state agencies, the ICC combined functions of investigation,
prosecution, and adjudication. It was independent of executive control.
It was the prototype of the American federal regulatory agency-possessing all the functions and powers necessary to compel private
business to operate in the public interest. The 1887 Commission was
remarkably toothless and was rendered even more ineffectual by hostile
court decisions.
By 1920, however, with the aid of excellent
5

Many boards and commissions, especially at the state level, engage only in
adjudication; rulemaking, investigation and prosecution has been split off into different
agencies.
6I found the following sources useful in understanding the historic trends that I have
sketched here. Louis L. Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965);
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, FINAL REPORT: ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (1940) (and accompanying monographs); Paul
Verkuil et. al., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, 1992-2 ACUS Rec. & Rep. 777;
James Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Officer

Problem--Symptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q. 281 (1955); Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1986).
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commissioners and staff, statutory amendments, and more sympathetic
judicial treatment, the Commission became a powerful, effective, and
respected regulator of the railroads.
The ICC did its business through case-by-case adjudication
involving specific rate disputes between shippers and carriers. Supreme
Court decisions required that due process be observed in this
adjudication process. Since there was a high volume of cases, many of
them technical, the ICC commissioners were unable to hear the cases
en banc or even by splitting up into panels. They deputized ICC staff
members to serve as hearing examiners in these cases. The examiners
conducted trials, made a record, and, after a time, started issuing
recommended decisions. At first, those decisions were accorded little
deference and considered of little importance; the ICC staff worked
institutionally with the commissioners to produce the final agency
decision which took the form of a detailed written precedential opinion.
In time, however, ICC hearing examiners became more
professionalized and their decisions received greater deference; indeed,
the examiners often worked closely with the Commissioners in
producing final decisions. These ICC trial examiners were the genesis
of today's ALJs.
The ICC served as the model for the Federal Trade Commission
which emerged in 1914 to deal with the problem of monopoly. FTC
examiners (who often were also the investigators) conducted hearings
and worked closely with the agency heads in producing final decisions.
During the New Deal of the 1930's, a large number of new independent,
combined-function agencies emerged to deal with the actual and
perceived causes of the great depression. The idea was that agencies
would exercise their expertise to solve the problems that the market had
failed to solve. The ICC and FTC served as the model for this kind of
agency (as well as many regulatory agencies being formed at the state
level).
By this time, regulation by federal combined-functions agencies
had became extremely controversial. Most everyone respected the ICC
(or at least conceded its inevitability), but the new agencies were
another story. New Deal agencies started muscling in on the kind of
business decisions that had always been free of regulation and propelled
by market forces---labor relations, corporate finance, communications,
banking, agriculture, pricing and output decisions of all kinds. The
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volume of administrative adjudication increased rapidly. In addition to
resentment about regulation in general, there was a great deal of quite
justified skepticism about the fairness of agency decisionmaking.
Agencies had no internal separation of functions and agency heads
seemed to the private sector to be biased against them. Even supporters
of the New Deal questioned the way that agency adjudication was
conducted. For a time, the Supreme Court had stood as a bulwark
against the New Deal; beginning in 1937, however, the Court
abandoned most efforts to block the administrative state by invalidating
programs or upgrading agency procedures.
The struggle over
administrative procedure led eventually to enactment of the federal
APA in 1946. The epic political battle can be understood as involving
two separate struggles.
One struggle was between institutionalists and judicialists. An
institutionalist believes that the primary function of administrative
adjudication is to formulate and apply public policy. The process for
producing an agency adjudicatory decision should resemble a
corporation's decision to produce a new product. Decisionmakers
should be free to talk to anyone who can contribute; every member of
the staff should participate in making the decision in whatever way
seems appropriate; there should be no separation of functions. An
institutionalist is concerned with producing accurate and consistent
decisions quickly and efficiently. The emphasis is on fitting each
decision into a wise application of regulatory policy. Due process and
judicial review, in this view, are necessary evils.
Ajudicialist has a wholly different orientation. The judicialist
believes that the emphasis should be on fairness and due process for the
private party.
The model should be civil litigation in court.
Adjudication should apply existing policy, not make new policy with
retroactive application. There should be a rigid separation between
prosecution and judging, even if this means the process is less efficient
and may not produce a decision that implements consistent agency
policy. Judicial review is essential and courts should have broad
powers.
Needless to say, avid New Dealers tended to be
7

Scholars of this period are indebted to George B. Shepard's illuminating treatment
of the origins of the APA. Fierce Compromise: The AdministrativeProcedureAct Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw.U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996).
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institutionalists; opponents of the New Deal tended to be judicialists.
A second struggle was overtly political. Proponents of the New
Deal believed that government regulation by expert agencies was the
only salvation for the economy. Opponents believed that government
interference with free markets was catastrophically wrong, would make
the Depression worse, and would lead to socialism or fascism. These
views translated directly into views on administrative procedure.
Proponents of regulation favored streamlined agency procedures with
little attention to due process, separation of functions, or judicial
review. Opponents of regulation favored detailed administrative
procedure codes and intensive judicial review in order to slow down
and encumber the regulatory process as much as possible.
The institutionalist/New Deal opponent coalition, strongly
supported by the ABA, first attempted to adopt legislation for an
administrative court, but this got nowhere. Ultimately, the coalition
succeeded in passing the Walter-Logan Bill of 1940 which would have
drastically inhibited the regulatory process in New Deal agencies.
Walter-Logan required more intrusive judicial review and would have
rigidified the adjudication process (for example, it required three-person
panels to conduct adjudication). President Roosevelt vetoed the bill.
Meanwhile, in 1939 Roosevelt appointed the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, hoping that it would suggest
moderate reforms. That Committee's 1940 report provided extensive
monographs on the administrative process, replacing superheated
political rhetoric with solid empirical information on how agencies
actually functioned. The majority report of the Attorney General's
Committee recommended quite modest reforms to the adjudication
process. It rejected a central panel, but it recommended upgrading the
status of hearing officers. A minority report would have gone much
further in regulating the adjudicatory process.
The administrative procedure battles were set aside during
World War II, but revived afterwards. Roosevelt realized he had to
agree to reform; conservatives realized that any solution had to be
acceptable to Roosevelt. In a historic compromise, the APA emerged
from Congress in 1946 and served as the model for state APAs in the
years to come. Virtually every word in the Act represented a hardfought compromise. Historians of the APA have observed that the
unanimous votes that produced the APA were highly misleading.
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Nobody was happy with the Bill, but all sides felt they were better off
with the bill than with the status quo.
Who got what in the APA compromise? From the point of view
of institutionalists/New Deal supporters:
The New Deal combined-function independent agencies
survived. Adjudication was not separated from rulemaking,
investigation, and prosecution.
Hearing examiners remained employees of the agency for
which they decided cases; there was no central panel.
Agency heads retained power to make final agency
decisions.
A great deal of federal administrative adjudication remained
outside the APA structure (so called informal adjudication,
including most benefactory programs).
Judicial review remained subject to sharp limitations such
as the requirement of exhaustion of remedies and limited
scope of review of factual and discretionary decisions.
From the point of view ofjudicialists/New Deal opponents:
An array of due-process like protections were provided for formal
adjudication.
The APA imposed internal separation of functions,
preventing adversaries from taking part in adjudication
(albeit with considerable exceptions).
Hearing examiners were granted an array of protections.
Agencies lost control over the hiring, evaluation,
compensation, and termination of their judges. The judges
could not be supervised by prosecutors, were to be full-time
judges, were protected from ex parte contact, and were
assigned cases in rotation. They issued proposed decisions
which became final unless the agency heads took over the
case.
Rulemaking was subject for the first time to mandatory
notice and comment requirements (again with significant
exceptions).
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Access to judicial review was assured in most cases.
Thus both sides got something from the APA, but neither side
was pleased. New Deal proponents predicted that the administrative
process would be negatively affected by the new array ofjudicial-type
provisions. New Deal opponents lamented that they still had to contend
with the same old combined-function agencies that seemed so biased
against business. Neither, perhaps, foresaw that the APA would turn
out to be the Magna Charta for the administrative state, legitimizing the
process of rulemaking and adjudication, and remaining fundamentally
unchanged up to the end of the century.
For purposes of this article, the big story of the APA is that it
transformed the disrespected crew of agency hearing examiners into the
highly respected and highly protected corps of ALJs we know today.
This occurred, I believe, because the New Dealers insisted on
preserving the combined-function agency. Agencies like the NLRB
and the SEC must, they thought, continue to make the rules, investigate,
prosecute, and adjudicate. All right, the opponents countered, at least
let's elevate the status of the front-line decisionmaker--the hearing
examiner. Let's go as far as we can toward making the person who
hears the witnesses into a true judge. Thus the array of independenceprotecting provisions in the APA. Well, the proponents countered, if
we have to live with judicializing the hearing examiner function, let's
make sure that the agency heads get the final call on all issues of fact,
law, and discretion. And thus the key provision in the APA emerged:
"On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision .......
In my view, none of this would have happened if the APA had
gone the route of separating the adjudicating function from the
rulemaking and adversary functions or if it had endorsed a central panel
of administrative judges. If adjudication were conducted in a separate
agency, or in an administrative court of some kind, the various
elaborate protections for hearing examiner independence in the APA
would have been unnecessary and superfluous.
The adjudicating
agency or administrative court would have hired and evaluated its own

'APA §557(b).
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ALJs and assigned them to cases as it saw fit; since that agency would
not be engaged in law enforcement, there would be little need to
construct elaborate protections of the judges' independence. Thus the
ironic effect of the decision to preserve combined-function agencies
was to spawn the administrative judiciary as we know it today.
In this highly abbreviated historic survey, only a few more
events are worth mentioning. The status of hearing examiners was
sharply elevated, and the status of agency heads sharply diminished, by
the Universal Camera9 decision in 1951. In Universal Camera,there
was a credibility dispute between A and B concerning the reasons for
discharging an employee. The hearing examiner believed A. The
agency heads believed B. The Supreme Court held that courts review
the agency head decision, not that of the ALJ. Nevertheless, the fact
that the ALJ believed a witness that the agency heads disbelieved is a
minus factor in applying the substantial evidence test. As a result,
agency heads became much less likely to substitute their judgment on
credibility questions for that of a hearing examiner. The hearing
examiner's proposed decision became far more significant than it was
before.
The next event worth mentioning was the 1972 decision by the
Civil Service Commission (later codified by legislation) that renamed
federal hearing examiners as ALJs. This very welcome improvement
in status only recognized what had already occurred: the APA's
independence-protecting provisions had already transformed the federal
administrative judiciary into a highly independent, highly
professionalized judicial corps.
The final event I'll mention is the trend toward central panels in
the states. About half the states now have stripped at least some of their
agencies of their captive judges, moving the judges into a separate
agency.
Central panels have some very important advantages,
particularly in giving private parties the sense their cases are being
heard by an independent judge. This trend is gathering momentum,
something like freedom of information or sunshine laws did a
generation ago. The way things are going, the vast majority of the
states will undoubtedly have central panels in the next twenty years.

9

Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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Ultimately, the federal government will have to fall into line. Perhaps
when the federal central panel finally emerges, the APA provisions
relating to the ALJs (particularly those relating to hiring, specialization,
and evaluation) can also be re-considered.
The ALJ emerges out of this long history as the result of a series
of compromises unique to the U.S. First came the combined-function
regulatory agencies which became necessary because essential
industries remained in private rather than governmental hands. Those
agencies mostly made policy through case-by-case adjudication. As a
result, they ultimately found it necessary to delegate the function of
conducting hearings to hearing examiners. Next came the titanic
struggle over the APA and the New Deal. The historic compromise
that emerged retained combined-function agencies but it also produced
the provisions protecting the independence of the person conducting the
hearings. Today, those very independent people, whom we know as
ALJs, are the face of justice for the vast array of private citizens
embroiled in administrative disputes with state or federal agencies.

